

SEEING GOD IN LEVIATHAN: THE RIDDLE  
OF HEGEL'S STATE THEORY

Introduction

The purpose of the present study is to show that Hegel's Idea of the state may be put to a constructive test against Hobbes' political theory. The question is what Hegel's theory provides that Hobbes' does not. As far as Hegel's own assessment of the theory of natural right is concerned, it was ambiguous. He wrote: "A grand and pure vision may..truly express the ethos of a people (Sittlichkeit).. To the degree that this, its appearance, is regarded as an outcome..it coincides exactly with the Idea."<sup>1</sup> But, on the other hand, he characterized Hobbes' theory as being "like a building, which expresses the spirit of its maker mutely..without presenting a coherent picture..with use of concepts as is only clumsily styled reasoning." Hegel concludes this monumental insult: Hobbes' vision "is therefore never to be apprehended as Idea."<sup>2</sup>

Imagine Hobbes' surprise. He had thought of his own work as providing a "firm and lasting edifice."<sup>3</sup>

The riddle of Hegel's state theory is framed in terms of the contradiction that natural right both may and may not be apprehended as Idea. What is the Idea?

It is short for 'Absolute Idea' which may be figuratively understood as God's knowledge of himself, and more literally known as the highest form of philosophic knowledge--from which nothing is excluded. This not only constitutes the whole of human know-

ledge, collected in thought at will; but even more, it is the only knowledge--and hence the best knowledge, which the world has of itself. The absolute idea's leading characteristic is that it not only tramples the compartments of human knowledge down (each is an instance of consciousness) but it includes the various objects of the sciences within it, no longer objects isolated and specialized within set fields, but objects fully included within the consciousness through which they are known. The objects within the sciences are studied as they are conceived to be 'in themselves'. Within the comprehension of the absolute idea, the objects of the sciences and of human thought generally, are postulated by Hegel as becoming self-conscious since they are comprehended in the Idea by no one in particular as they are 'in-and-for-themselves'--i.e., in the 'freedom' of their concepts.

The closest one can come to realizing what Hegel meant with this, from the perspective of mundane awareness, is to mark the difference between loving someone and knowing that one's love is recognized and answered. Love is very different from acknowledged love, as every lover knows full well.

The riddle of Hegel's state theory, then, is the riddle of his simultaneous absorption of the whole of Hobbes' theory of natural right, while suspending its validity as being only a result, annulled and superceded<sup>4</sup> in Hegel's version of science (Wissenschaft), which is the science of the Idea.

#### Evolution of the Riddle

The development of the Philosophy of Right's leading ideas, by which Hegel's state philosophy became the theory of the modern

secular nation state, turns on his designation of the domain of politics as belonging to what he called 'objective spirit'. This term made its first appearance in the Encyclopedia (1817) and replaced Hegel's designation of political life as belonging to the domain of 'absolute spirit', which had been the case in Hegel's two early (1802) political works.<sup>5</sup> The perception of state life as 'objective spirit' is a distinction of enormous importance. It enabled Hegel to sort out the crucial difference between the ancient polis and the modern nation state, a difference expressible in two words: individual freedom.

In his effort to come to terms with the ancient city state, Hegel had written:

In order to fathom the Idea of social morality, it is necessary to reconcile vision (Anschauung) completely with conception (Begriff), for the Idea is nothing but the identity of both.. Its vision is an absolute people. Its conception is the absolute union (Einssein) of its individuals.<sup>6</sup>

This formula for conceiving states as a union of concept with intuition flew in the face of Kant whose formalism dictated the impossibility of the ego's reaching any practical conclusions whatsoever. As Joseph Maier has written: "As soon as practical reason attempts to demonstrate its validity in any given concrete individual problem..it must borrow the content of the given action from the world of phenomena." And, since the phenomena apprehended in intuition (Anschauung) may never be known to be what things in themselves are, "(t)he law that the practical reason is said to dictate fails the moment it has to produce its first concrete content."<sup>7</sup>

The actual character of states is not to be derived, therefore, from Kant's conceptions of morality; for it is the business of

states, if not of morals, to distinguish particular actions as being right or wrong. Hegel's summary of the limits of Kant's morality for statecraft was that "(t)hrough the absoluteness of his propositions...absoluteness of content escapes, and therefore becomes reconstituted in maxims (Grundsätze)." <sup>8</sup> That the laws of states become dogmatic (rather than remaining moral) the moment they designate particular actions right or wrong, sits ill with Hegel's idea that social morality (Sittlichkeit) is the foundation of the absolute union of the state's individuals.

Hobbes, too, was outspoken concerning the limitations of ethics ('right reasons') for producing union in the state:

Theft, Murther, Adultery, and all injuries are forbid by the Laws of Nature, but what is to be called Theft, what Murther, what Adultery, what injury in a Citizen, this is not determined by the natural, but by the civil Law. <sup>9</sup>

Though Hegel carped against Hobbes' method (an "old, throughout inconsequential empiricism" <sup>10</sup>), their results agree. Without an interpretation of the community's ethical standards in law, there can be no state or, in Hobbes' definition, no "union of wills in one will." <sup>11</sup>

Hobbes' methods, however, were clear enough to make it known that he would have resisted deriving the state from the Idea as being 'in-and-for-itself' in thought, ideas being "nothing really but motion in some internal substance of the head." <sup>12</sup> His idea of the infinite (which is the Idea's freedom) was on a short leash too: "I know S. Thomas Aquinas calls Eternity, Nunc Stans, an ever-abiding now, which is easy to say, but though fain I would, yet could I never conceive it." <sup>13</sup>

These are some surface disparities. They indicate, but do

not explain, the differences Hegel wanted to establish for differentiating his theory from Hobbes' results. One may easily wonder what bond there is between them. Hobbes' political theory does not deductively yield Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. But this is scarcely a valid criticism of his theory of the state.

Clarendon, whose interest, unlike Hegel's, was to tear Hobbes' theory to the ground, made a basic objection against Hobbes. Its inadequacy helps establish what the attraction to Hobbes was, in Hegel, even on the highest perch of his Wissenschaft. Clarendon supposed (with no small degree of pleasure, I think) that Hobbes and some other man were both condemned to death "(which is the most formidable thing Mr. Hobbes can conceive)." Clarendon fires: "the other would no more by looking into himself know Mr. Hobbes's present thoughts, and the extent of his fear, than he could, by looking in his face, know what he hath in his pocket."<sup>14</sup>

This objection, as witty as it is mistaken, represents an attempt to erase the similitude of men. One does not look into his cell-mate's face in order to find out what he has in his pocket. But Clarendon's effort does go to the root of Hobbes' political philosophy, as J.W.N. Watkins' remark attests:

If the sovereign knew nothing of the inside workings of his subjects' minds....He would be like a policeman in charge of a madhouse, always afraid that his inscrutable subjects would unaccountably turn on him.<sup>15</sup>

Hobbes' starting point is his insistence upon an equality of persons, by nature. This undercuts Clarendon's (and the English Puritans') idea that proper government is founded on the dictates of their own, especially sensitive, consciences. The truth of it is, confession of human equality is an insupportable idea for

every champion of special interest. Against Hobbes' development of his theory of the state, founded squarely upon equality, Clarendon offered consistent, if unreasonable objections: "And we have great reason to watch him very narrowly when his legislative fit is on him, lest he cast such a net over us..that we be deprived both of the use of our liberty, and our reason to oppose him."<sup>16</sup> Freedom is Slavery?

Hobbes' political philosophy takes for granted the practical possibility of achieving a union of wills in one will. Against this possibility stand a thousand reasons which boil down to one: private interest. The form private interests assume is better known in civilization than the multiplication table is. This sad fact has a name. It is man's passion for social domination; whether criminal, corporate, or religious, its structure is the projection of one's reasons upon life, as upon a blank screen, in contravention of the real life of the community. In every instance of domination one finds reason absolutized by people whose wills are rationalized upon the determination to prevail against existing conditions. State union is always deemed unreasonable by persons of this sort, and never without masses of reasons and as many arguments.

So Hobbes' idea of the equality of persons is no optimistic bit of head-work, paving the way to some crazy utopia. Equality is evident in every sort of quarrel, in every competitive form of human behavior, where the losers think of themselves, or their ideas, or of their social alliances as being sufficient to bring the winner down and make him the loser in their place. What sense

does it make, within this riot of life, to appeal to a union of wills in the will of a sovereign state power?

### Hobbes' Philosophical Rudiments

The evolution of Hobbes' state theory underwent none of the major changes discoverable in Hegel, who shifted from a description of the state as absolute spirit (1802) to the designation of it in the Philosophy of Right (1821) as objective spirit. This change parallels Hobbes' calling the state a 'city' in the Rudiments (1651) (he was evidently thinking of Plato), and a 'common-wealth' in Leviathan (1651). This change is suggestive, since Hegel's late theory was based on his effort to locate the modern state's distinctiveness. Hobbes had already modernized his theory in the Rudiments where he framed his fundamental definitions and arguments; these were only carried into detail in Leviathan (often word for word). In Leviathan the city drops quietly from view.

What I wish to focus on in this section, is the logical intersection of Hegel's and Hobbes' political philosophies. Both share a sympathy with the singular, captivating metaphor of Plato's Republic: the state is one soul. It is the 'soul writ large'.

It is foolish, I think, to argue that the soul writ large is sensibly different from a union of wills in one will. Equally fruitless is to try and find a departure from this in Hegel's Idea of the state as an objective ethical community.

The reason every argument of this sort will fail is that all three state concepts are like-minded metaphors with one sense and three descriptions, to wit: the city state, the nation state, and the (near) modern, secular, constitutional monarchy, respectively.

The logical reference these definitions have give them an order of precision different from, say, the quadratic formula, which has no reference at all. This is one of the two reasons (the other is quasi-religious) which prompted Hegel to think of the state as 'reason's hieroglyph'.

The metaphoric definitions which all three of these first-rate thinkers assigned the state is necessitated by the fact that there is no such thing as 'the state'--there are only particular states, whose life and times are of interest to their citizens, their neighbors, and to historians.

What is irreducible in Hobbes' state theory is his argument that making states is identical with a set of distinctly human (even if necessitated) choices, ratified by society at large. The chief consequence of his argument is that choosing operates in such a way that human nature renders itself distinct from the rest of nature. Behind this conclusion lay Hobbes' own unusual reasons. Men and animals share the trait of thinking about how things are caused (or how to get them). What is different about us is "when imagining anything whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it when we have it."<sup>17</sup>

This sort of curiosity is distinctly human; it renders nature usable to us, so that the objective operations of nature become avenues for the elaboration and satisfaction of distinctly human passions. Within the limits of this human curiosity, objectivity and the objectification of nature turn out in every instance to be the fastidious exploration of pressing human interests

which the natural world may be made to serve. Science is the effort to wrest from mute nature an answer to the question whether the things of nature (generally, matter) are so constituted as to satisfy the human desires in terms of which alone the artifice of scientific law is to be explained. This, as I shall argue presently, gives a clear indication of the limitations of objectivity; not because human desires are involved in the evolution of scientific objectivity, but because nature remains subjective to the laws we frame about it.

So a set of distinctly social facts answers to the difference between man and nature, as is shown by the structure of the social communities of animals: even the orderly ants and bees are

..not to be termed political, because their government is only a consent, or many wills concurring in one object, not (as is necessary in civil government) one will.<sup>18</sup>

Hobbes argued to show that states are not to be derived from nature (as Aristotle had supposed) and not from God; neither from a divine moral predisposition of man towards goodness (as Clarendon, Cumberland, Taylor, Warrender, Plato and the Cambridge Platonists thought); nor from contract (as Locke was to suppose); nor from force alone (as Thrasymachus, Machiavelli, and all the mechanists believed).

Within the terms of Hegel's mature state theory, both Hobbes and Hegel exclude 'absolute spirit' (religion and philosophy) for making states. This fact, taken together with their arguments against 'subjective spirit' (private moral reasons and the 'passions') for making the state, a choice is forced for making the state equivalent to the domain of 'objective spirit'. What is

objective about making a state is that (unlike in science) man is as well the matter of it as its artificer. The state, in short, is man's only rational answer to the "riot of life" with which the reader was left at the close of the last section.

Chapter Five of Hobbes' Rudiments provides his argument why this should be the case: "I. That the Laws of Nature are not sufficient to preserve Peace. II. That the Laws of Nature in the State of Nature are silent. III. That the security of living according to the Laws of Nature consists in the concord of many Persons."

These conditions are in exact conformity with Hegel's elimination of contenders for the foundations of state power. Hegel's name for the reasons guiding persons into a state union is an 'ethical community'; this stands in majesty above all and any particular interests contained within it.

Hobbes continues: "IV. That the concord of many persons is not constant enough for a lasting Peace." (Point V is that animals have no civil government, as already shown.) "VI. That not only Consent but union is also required to establish the Peace of men. VII. What union is. VIII. In union the Right of all men is conveyed to one."<sup>19</sup>

This succession of reasons march together with Hegel's differentiation of the state as an 'objective spirit'.

As I have indicated already, it is difficult to find (and impossible to prove) a mathematically precise logical conjunction of the state theories considered here. Even more to the point, might it not be fruitless even if one should succeed in doing it?

Finding what is common to theories is likely to unearth what everyone already knows. But since it was Hegel's express declaration that natural right is both identical with the Idea and never the same as the Idea, it is necessary, in order to discover what the fundamental logical differences are separating Hobbes and Hegel, to indicate first what identity lies between them. Their identity turns out to be a set of conclusions concerning what the state is and what it is not. In Hobbes' words, the structure of what the state is stands as follows: "that power, greater than which cannot by man be conveyed on a man, we call ABSOLUTE."<sup>20</sup>

What is conveyed by the subjects to their sovereign (whether a man or a committee) is simply a union of those powers which everyone has by nature; what the subjects convey to the king (or government) is original with each person and natural to all. Consider punishment:

For the subjects did not give the sovereign that right; but only in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all; so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him only.<sup>21</sup>

When citizens use their natural powers and enlist their fellows in a manner that erodes the sovereign's ability to keep peace, it is dominion. So, to absolute power answers obedience, "although for some reason it may sometimes by Right, be denied, yet because a greater cannot be performed, we call it SIMPLE."<sup>22</sup>

In distinction to simple obedience is service, or in the worst case, servitude: "he is FREE indeed, who serves the City only; but a SERVANT is he who also serves his fellow subject..<sup>23</sup>

Hegel's specification of the objectivity of each ethical com-

munity is joined in Hobbes' description of societal breakdown--  
in each case a return to subject-despotism:

..when private men or subjects demand liberty, under the name of liberty, they ask not for liberty, but dominion.. for if every man would grant the same liberty.. that same natural state would return again, in which all men may by Right do all things.<sup>24</sup>

Finally, Hobbes established the non-subjectivity of government by showing that even in a democracy either there is no contract of subjects with the people (who are sovereign), or there is no state:

Now if after that government is framed, the subject make any contract with the People, it is in vain, because the People contains within its will the will of that subject to whom it is supposed to be obliged; and therefore may at its own will and pleasure disengage itself, and by consequence is now actually free.<sup>25</sup>

What are the limits of the freedom of the state? Only its own will: "For he that hath strength enough to protect all, wants not sufficiency to oppress all."<sup>26</sup> Other limits to the state are none, except the power of another state, in war.

The identity in Hobbes' and Hegel's state theories is the objectivity of every union of wills in one will (i.e., every 'ethical community'). Objectivity, as I have suggested already, is normally conceived of in the context of the sciences. But this is limited in comparison to the objectivity of the acts of states, where the declarations of law operate within the wills of those who are the 'matter' upon which the law operates. Compare physics. Its laws are laws of the heavenly bodies, and of the parts of matter in our world and in distant ones. Physical matter could not be less indifferent to the laws by which its actions are known to be governed. As a result of this model of objectivity, passion has been set aside as excluded from our standards of objectivity (cf.,

the standard observer's repeatable experimental conclusions). The objectivity of scientific inquiry shares the limits of dispassion with the objects of its inquiry: mind is made to hallucinate the stars' impersonality as being man's highest intellectual achievement. But the inquiry itself belies every such hallucination. There has never existed a star with scientific ambitions.

The pinnacle of physics is also expressive of man's deepest interest in the natural world. I am thinking of the law of matter's transformation into energy.

By contrast, the case for objectivity is much stronger in the state; the conversion of the matter of the state into its energy is the will of the people. The only laws which may actually govern a people are those articulating its union of wills; and the matter upon which these laws operate are the knowing subjects without whose concurrence the union required to frame the laws in the first place would never have existed. Hegel summarizes:

The basis of right is, in general, mind..while the system of right is the realm of freedom made actual, the world of mind brought forth out of itself like a second nature.<sup>27</sup>

The push Hobbes gives his perception of the state entails the most resonant and rational sense one may assign the word "objectivity." It goes through, in Hobbes' work, from the first to the last word.

#### The Defining Elements of Hegel's State Riddle

The result of Hobbes' train of thought is the establishment of an identity of Hobbes' arguments with Hegel's 'objective spirit'. Against this identity, Hegel's differences may be weighed to settle

his claim that the state most conformable to the demands of his science is a modern constitutional monarchy.

The real freight the Idea is made to carry against the grain of Hobbes' state theory may be summed up in two points. The first concerns the divine right of kings. Hegel apprehends

..the monarch's right as grounded in the authority of God.. We are familiar, however, with the misunderstandings connected with this idea, and it is precisely this "divine" element which it is the task of a philosophic treatment to comprehend.<sup>28</sup>

Hegel compares the birthright of kings with the validity of the ontological argument, concluding that those (like Kant) who deny the ontological argument's validity are doomed to make similar political errors on the basis of the sort of mental abstractiveness which "denies that the moment of ultimate decision in the state is linked implicitly and actually (i.e., in the rational concept) with the immediate birthright of the monarch."<sup>29</sup>

The second point which runs counter to the arguments of Hobbes I should like to touch upon only briefly. It is Hegel's re-insistence upon Plato's natural classes in the state: the family is essentially agrarian, there is a distinct class of tradespeople, and so forth and so on. Hegel's treatment of social distinctions as part of nature is a dogmatic return to Plato's idea of souls of brass, silver and gold.

From Hobbes' perspective this is distinctly retrogressive; a re-conquest of significant human choice by the forces of nature. Nature enters only unwittingly into the socialization process. We choose things from it, own, modify and reconstitute them in conformity with the promptings of human desire. Hegel parted company

from Plato by affirming private property: "The general principle that underlies Plato's ideal state violates the right of personality by forbidding the holding of private property."<sup>30</sup> The possession of property is a function of nature's deficit of will. The void of will in the things one may possess makes the thing possessed an expression of the personality of whomever it belongs to. I think of Cebes when I see Cebes' coat. What may be concluded from this is that the expression of human will in ownership makes owning, holding, and modifying the things of nature a social act in every case--whether done alone or in company. To own a thing, in short, is to express myself (implicitly or explicitly) to others.

So the institutionalization of the ownership of property is that state's ratification of man's social proclivities and of his outreach into nature. Recognition of man's rights in property is intended to stabilize the life of society within the state. Slavery (where a deficit of will is imagined first, and then made to exist in another human being) is interdicted: "Man's absolute unfitness for slavery..is something which does not come to our minds until we recognize that the Idea of freedom is genuinely actual only as the state."<sup>31</sup>

This is a key to modernity's advance over antiquity, where the citizen "must not only surrender a part of his freedom, but himself, entire."<sup>32</sup> The ancient city was able to free human society to a considerable extent from the vicissitudes of nature; but its concept of property included slavery as a means to this end. The result of this was exposure of the individual to the state's own vicissitudes.

### The Riddle's Solution

"The science of natural right is as equal to the other sciences as mechanics is to physics,"<sup>33</sup> wrote Hegel. The defining elements of Hegel's state riddle are: 1) The divine right of kings, and 2) The supposition of natural class divisions in society. Hegel's solution to 2) is the balance of private interests within society by appointing a new class of 'guardians' in the modern state--a bureaucratic 'universal class'. Its job is to heal the societal rifts created by the disparity between the rich (the dominant corporations) and the poor (those disenfranchised owing to race, lack of education, and so on). Its mandate (like the guardians of old) is to keep the state intact against domination by the few, so that all members of society may express their freedom in ethical union with the state. The final word for the state (when it is working) is "we."

Whether this proposal is any good or not is being presently decided in our lives.

From the idea of natural classes, three results have historically followed. The fascist political theory of corporitivism (Rocco, Gentile) evolved from the need for a theory of distributive justice, based on corporate ownership and industrial development of the resources of nature. Communist theory took its rise (Marx, Lenin) from Hegel's 'universal class' idea, which it absolutized. What these two theories, based on class as social fixtures, have in common is Clarendon's passion to find out what a man "hath in his pocket."

The third consequence of government by class establishment is the modern protest movement of government by ecology. The

global protection of nature (ourselves included) is this movement's focus and aim.

These are alternatives to be measured against Hobbes' idea of sovereignty, since they exhaust naturalism as distinct from natural right. The latter is founded on human nature, as I have argued in this paper; the former on nature itself.

There are two ironies disclosed in the comparison. The first is that all forms of government which focus on class establishment rule with an iron hand; fascists in the name of distributive justice and communists in the name of the abolition of class conflict.

The second irony completes Hegel's state riddle while it provides one with the key to its solution. Hegel argued against sovereignty in Hobbes' sense by demoting the king from sovereign to the figurehead of government. He is a symbol of the sanctity of human personality. He indicates how one might live. His only remaining vestige of power is the right to issue pardons to criminals.

The right of succession, then, comes down to the right to be a symbol of sovereignty, its cipher; this is a slender thread indeed for tying together the birth of kings with the majesty of God. Hegel's is an essentially Protestant perception. God and king are both subject to philosophic interpretation where, as in Aquinas' case earlier, the figurative mysteries of religion are to be rationally comprehended. But Hegel's monarch-cipher is an artistic flourish measured against the ethical responsibility of the sovereign power in Hobbes' theory (whether the sovereign is a man, a counsel, or the people).

The mechanics of government in Hegel's theory devolves to

settlement of the questions attending class conflicts. In consequence, the work of government has been the provision of solutions to macro-economic problems. This, and the theories which have sprung from it, are based on an error of judgement on Hegel's part. His theory of class, and more importantly, the mechanics of government which are its legacy, I should like to wait to explore fully at another time.

The solution to Hegel's state riddle--the hieroglyph of the sovereign's birthright over practically nothing, may be presented without further ado. The mystic union of the king with God leaves actual sovereignty to wander away to join, ignore, obstruct, or lie down at the mercy of the macro-economic questions which torment contemporary society.

I am not arguing for tyranny in place of what we have already. I'm arguing that what we have already is one distinct form of tyranny, social tyranny, which will continue so long as sovereignty is conceived in terms of any social class whatsoever.

As for Hegel's connection between the king and God, Hobbes has a tart reply prepared: "If Livy says the Gods once made a cow to speak and we believe it not, we do not distrust God therein, but Livy."<sup>34</sup>

Hegel's 'physics' of the Idea, with which Hobbes' 'mechanics' was to be invalidated, falls short. Science, I should like to conclude, is a road which has never led to clarity in the state, and never will.

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## NOTES

In the notes below, I have cross-referenced citations from Hobbes with The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, edited by Sir William Molesworth, 11 vols. (London: J. Bohn, 1839-45), hereafter cited as EW.

1. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Ueber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlung des Naturrechts, seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie, und sein Verhaeltnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften," Journal der Philosophie 2 (Stueck 2/3 1802-1803), reprinted in Hegels Saemmtliche Werke, ed. Hermann Glockner (Stuttgart: Frommans Verlag, 1958), 1:454.
2. Ibid.
3. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Printed for Andrew Crooke, 1651), 18 & EW, 3:29.
4. See Gustav Mueller, "The Legend of 'Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis'," Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (June 1958).
5. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, System der Sittlichkeit, ed. Georg Mollat (Osterwieck/Harz: A.W. Zickfeldt, 1893), from a manuscript dated 1802. For the other work of the same date, see note one, above.
6. Hegel, System, Introduction (no pagination given).
7. Joseph Maier, On Hegel's Critique of Kant (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), 51-52.
8. Hegel, "Ueber," 445.
9. Thomas Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society (London: Printed by F.G., 1651), 100-1 & EW, 2:85.

10. Hegel, "Ueber," 454.
11. Hobbes, Rudiments, 79 & EW, 2:68.
12. Thomas Hobbes, Human Nature (London: Printed by T. Newcome, 1650), 69 & EW, 4:31.
13. Thomas Hobbes, Of Liberty and Necessity (London: Printed by W.B., 1654), 63 & EW, 4:271.
14. Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, A Brief View and Survey of the Dangerous and Pernicious Errors to Church and State In Mr. Hobbes's Book Entitled Leviathan (Oxford: Printed at the Theater, 1676), 13.
15. J.W.N. Watkins, Hobbes's System of Ideas (London: Hutchinson, 1965), 100-1.
16. Clarendon, A Brief View, 31.
17. Hobbes, Leviathan, 9 & EW, 3:13-14.
18. Hobbes, Rudiments, 77 & EW 2:66.
19. Ibid., from the Table of Contents, Chapter V.
20. Ibid., 94 & EW, 2:80.
21. Hobbes, Leviathan, 161-2 & EW, 3:289; see also J.W.N. Watkins, "Liberty," in Hobbes and Rousseau: A Collection of Critical Essays, eds. Maurice Cranston and Richard S. Peters (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1972).
22. Hobbes, Rudiments, 95 & EW, 2:82.
23. Ibid., 142 & EW, 2:121.
24. Ibid., 157 & EW, 2:135.
25. Ibid., 115 & EW, 2:98.
26. Ibid., 97 & EW, 2:80-81 (emphasis added).
27. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of Right,

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28. Ibid., 182.

29. Ibid., 185.

30. Ibid., 42.

31. Ibid., 48.

32. Manfred Riedel, Studien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie (Frankfurt an Main: Suhrkamp, 1969), 28.

33. Hegel, "Ueber," 437.

34. Hobbes, Leviathan, 32 & EW, 3:55.